Norway Wants Collisions Contained – Energy Assumptions Dangerous

 Accident, allision, collision, contact  Comments Off on Norway Wants Collisions Contained – Energy Assumptions Dangerous
Jan 052011
 
bigorangeafterbefore

Big Orange looking blue after contact with the Ekofisk platform

With 26 collisions in 10 years between offshore facilities and visiting vessels on the Norwegian shelf, six with very large hazard potentials, Norway’s Petroleum Safety Authority, has said enough is enough. The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) believes training and organisational factors should receive more attention, while at the same time, the technical failure rate must be reduced. Continue reading »

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PSA Releases Big Orange Audit

 collision, contact  Comments Off on PSA Releases Big Orange Audit
Nov 262010
 
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Big Orange XVIII Took it on the nose

Norway’s Petroleum Safety Authority and the Norwegian Maritime Directorate have released an audit of ConocoPhillips Skandinavia AS’ management of technical, organisational and administrative issues as regards hired vessels and vessel operations on the Ekofisk field.

The audit follows and investigation into an incident on 8 June 2009, the vessel Big Orange XVIII collided with the water injection facility Ekofisk 2/4-W. The collision caused extensive material damage to both the facility and the vessel.

The audit also included Schlumberger as the supplier of well stimulation services using vessels.

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Big Orange/Ekofisk Contact Energy “Six Times Higher than Designed To Take” – PSA

 Accident report, collision, contact  Comments Off on Big Orange/Ekofisk Contact Energy “Six Times Higher than Designed To Take” – PSA
Oct 142009
 
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Big Orange, big Crunch

Big Orange XVIII hit the water injection facility Ekofisk 2/4-W on 8 June 2009 with six times more energy than the facility was designed for, says a report from Norway’s Petroleum Safety Authority, PSA. The incident occurred because the autopilot on Big Orange had not been cancelled before it entered a 500 metre exclusion zone and so did not respond to course alterations input by the officer of the watch and Ekofisk Radar operators did not adequately monitor the vessel’s movements inside the exclusion zone and passed no warning to the vessel.

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