Apr 182012
 
How many slips are caused by people moving around slippery or greasy decks, possibly wearing inappropriate footwear?

Slips, trips and falls represent nearly one in three of the large personal injury claims submitted says the UK P&I Club, which has just issued a leaflet intended to reduce the incidence of such accidents.

Following the launch of its Bow Tie loss prevention initiative in January 2012, the UK P&I Club is publishing a series of ‘Risk Focus’ booklets which highlight specific areas of risk. This month’s is ‘Risk Focus: Slips, trips and falls’.

The Bow Tie loss prevention initiative involves surveyors visiting ships and, together with the managers and crew, producing Bow Tie charts specific to individual vessels that identify areas of risk and suggest how such risks might be mitigated.

Analysis of previous incidents over  23 years has enabled the club to identify ‘threats’, ‘consequences’ and ‘controls’, the foundations of developing reports on specific vessels. In total, the Club’s Risk Prevention Director Karl Lumbers estimates that it has identified seven primary risk hazards, 76 common threats, which if not contained could cause an incident and 450 controls which need to be in place and effective if the threats are to be contained.

Continue reading »

Apr 182012
 

Australia’s Transport Safety Bureau found that an injured third officer aboard the K-Line woodchip carrier Universal Gloria was so poorly trained that he was unaware of the difference between oxygen and air. The officer, on his first assignment as third, was badly burned when the air compressor he was using to fill a cylinder for an oxygen breathing apparatus, OBA, set, exploded.

During routine checks the third officer found that the pressure in one of the OBA cylinders in the fire locker was about 7 MPa, well below the normal 20 MPa, so he decided to remove the cylinder and take it to the steering compartment so he could use the compressor to re-fill it.

The third mate tried to screw the compressor discharge hose connector into the OBA cylinder, but it did not fit. He found an adaptor in the box next to the compressor that fitted both the OBA cylinder and the compressor discharge hose connector. He fitted the adaptor to the hose connector and then fitted it to the OBA cylinder.

The third mate checked all the connections and opened the OBA cylinder valve. Then, as he reached over the compressor to switch it on, the compressor discharge tube exploded. During this process, it is likely that the temperature of the oxygen-rich environment within the discharge hose and tube had dramatically increased due to adiabatic compression.

The heat of the oxygen rose beyond the auto-ignition temperature of the oil in the system, resulting in the explosion. The third officer was engulfed in a ball of flame. He jumped to his feet, regained his composure, and ran out of the steering compartment.

The AB reported the fire, which continued to burn on and around the compressor, to the bridge watchkeeper. He then went to the engine room to get a portable fire extinguisher. He quickly returned with an extinguisher and discharged its contents onto the fire, extinguishing it.

There are internationally recognised colour schemes used in industry so that high pressure cylinders containing different gases can be easily identified.

There are also a number of different types of engineering controls that prevent a high pressure cylinder from being connected to an incompatible system. An oxygen/acetylene welding set is an example where such engineering controls are used. The threads on the oxygen cylinder are right handed, whereas the threads on the acetylene cylinder are left handed. Therefore, the cylinders cannot be incorrectly connected to the welding set.

All ‘K’ Line ships were supplied with Kawasaki OBA sets and either Sabre or Kawasaki BA sets. The cylinders used in all these sets were colour coded. The BA cylinders were pale green in colour, signifying that they contained air and the OBA cylinders were black, indicating that they contained oxygen. The OBA cylinders were also labelled ‘oxygen’ (in Japanese only) and stamped with the molecular formula for oxygen ‘O2’.
The Sabre cylinders had a European standard threaded connection that was different to that of the Kawasaki air and oxygen cylinders. Therefore, the Kawasaki air and oxygen cylinders could not be connected to a Sabre BA set or an air compressor fitted with a European standard connection.
The Kawasaki cylinders were manufactured to conform to the Japanese standard for high pressure gas cylinder valves. However, the threaded connections on both types of Kawasaki cylinders were the same and there were no other engineering controls in place to prevent a Kawasaki oxygen cylinder from being connected to a Kawasaki BA set or an air compressor fitted with a Kawasaki type threaded connection.

Therefore, it was possible for a Kawasaki OBA cylinder to be inadvertently connected to an air compressor fitted with a Kawasaki type threaded connector.

The third mate did not understand that the pale green colour of the BA cylinders signified that they were filled with air, or that the compressor would re-fill them with air. Furthermore, he did not understand that air is a mixture of 78% nitrogen, 21% oxygen and other trace gases. In fact, he thought that oxygen and air were the same thing.

The ATSB investigation found that the explosion occurred as a result of a fire that started within the compressor when oil ignited in the hot oxygen-rich environment.

The investigation identified three safety issues. The crew were not appropriately trained or drilled in the operation and maintenance of the ship’s OBA sets; the ship’s safety management system did not provide the crew with appropriate guidance in relation to the operation and maintenance of the OBA sets; and there were no engineering controls in place to prevent the inadvertent connection of an OBA cylinder to the air compressor.

Fortunately, Universal Gloria had not suffered a serious fire: The ship’s fire fighting manual referred exclusively to fire fighting in the vehicle decks of a car carrier and, hence, was of little assistance to the crew on board a woodchip carrier.
ATSB Report

Apr 172012
 

Andrew Barberi

The US National Transportation Safety Board, NTSB, will hold a Board meeting on April 24, 2012, to determine the probable cause of the 2010 collision of the passenger ferry the Andrew Barberi with the St. George Terminal, Staten Island, New York, and another collision involving two BNSF Railway trains in Red Oak, Iowa.

The Board will also consider proposed safety recommendations to prevent similar accidents from occurring again.

The first item the Board will discuss is the May 8, 2010, collision of the Andrew Barberi into the St. George terminal shortly before the 244 passengers, who boarded the 310-foot commuter ferry on the borough of Manhattan, were scheduled to disembark at slip No. 5 at the Staten Island terminal.  Continue reading »

Apr 172012
 

Three seafarers were lucky to escape without serious injury

Catastrophic failure of a hatch-lid gantry crane on the dry cargo vessel Blue Note on 22 July 2 011, resulting in a close-call for three seafarers, highlights the importance of safety considerations in equipment design. As with certain lifeboats, the design of the gantry crane affected made it difficult to see whether hooks were properly secured while an attitude of expediency rather than safety prevailed onboard.

Says the recently released UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch, MAIB, report: ” The design of the crane made it difficult for ships’ staff to verify if the lifting hooks were correctly engaged in the lifting sockets provided on the hatch-lids…  There was no risk assessment covering the operation of the crane and movement of the hatch-lids. As a consequence, ship’s staff had adopted poorly considered working procedures that focused on expediency rather than safety”.

The result was that on 22 July 2011, the hatch-lid gantry crane derailed while it was carrying a single hatch-lid to its stowed position in preparation for discharging cargo.

Continue reading »

Apr 172012
 

One Filipino seafarer was killed and a Danish officer seriously injured in the incident in Kobe, Japan when boat falls allegedly failed.

Denmark’s Maritime Authority, DMA, has issued guidelines for abandon ship and fire drills following a fatality aboard the containership Anna Maersk on 27 March. One Filipino seafarer was killed and a Danish officer seriously injured in the incident in Kobe, Japan when boat falls allegedly failed.

Fatalities and injuries during lifeboat drills are disturbingly common but in recent years there have been a number of reports involving fast rescue craft. DMA says: “In recent years, the shipping industry has experienced an unacceptable number of serious accidents during abandon ship drills and fire drills”.

Continue reading »

Apr 112012
 

Lifeboats not as safe as assumed: PSA photo: Statoilhydro

Changes to the regulations regarding offshore lifeboats could now be on the way says the latest issue of Safety Status and Signals from Norway’s Petroleum Safety Authority .

Amended Norwegian rules for freefall and davit-launched lifeboats, their launch systems, and other rescue and evacuation equipment on offshore installations are under consideration. This work is being pursued by the PSA in dialogue with the companies and the unions through the tripartite Regulatory Forum.

Today’s offshore lifeboats with associated launch systems have significant weaknesses, and thereby fail to meet the level of safety which was earlier assumed to exist. That has made it necessary to initiate extensive compensatory measures, observes Sigurd Robert Jacobsen, a principal engineer with the PSA:“Safety must be the same for all who work in the Norway’s petroleum industry. At present, however, it depends on the type of lifeboat on an installation and on which compensatory measures have been adopted.” Continue reading »

Apr 112012
 

Marine Safety Forum reports a recent incident on board a vessel which highlights the importance of close interface between contractors working onboard and the vessel crews.

During the demobilization of contractor equipment, the equipment had to be Locked Out and Tagged Out (LOTO) to ensure that a “ZERO ENERGY STATE” had been achieved before work commenced.

The contractor visited the ECR and with vessel crew locked and tagged out the system and started work. The power was verified to be locked out at the equipment and isolated at the breaker in the deck distribution box and work commenced.

During work scope the lock out key was passed to another member of the contractor team who proceeded to the ECR to remove the LOTO and re-energised the system. Continue reading »

Apr 112012
 

Refloating of Clonlee at 1000 on the rising tide

What the UK’s Marine Accident Investigation Branch calls “a minimalistic approach …to the objectives of the ISM Code”, combined with a repetitive schedule that produced complacency, a cognitively overloaded Master, an electrical blackout and the lack of manuals for the power supply and distribution system, led to the grounding of the feeder containership Clonlee as she entered the Port of Tyne, England in March 2011.

The bridge and engine room teams did not use the emergency instructions checklist
after the grounding and the engine room team were not aware that the vessel was
aground.

Says the MAIB report synopsis”At 0110 on 16 March 2011, the Isle of Man registered feeder container vessel Clonlee suffered an electrical blackout as she entered the Port of Tyne, England. The ship’s engineers were unable to restore the ship’s power immediately and the vessel ran aground on Little Haven Beach at about 6 to 7 knots. The grounding caused no injuries and the vessel’s hull remained intact. Continue reading »

Apr 102012
 

The UK’s Marine Accident Investigation Board’s latest Safety Digest is, like its predecessors, insightful and informed with a certain British quirkiness that makes it highly readable. Among the accidents and lessons in the first edition of 2012 is an issue lose to MAC’s heart: confined spaces and, in particular, the hazards posed by adjacent spaces.

In this case ‘panting’ during rough weather was involved. It has happened before (See The Case of the Tablets Of Love). In this case, ferrous metal turnings described as ‘steaming’ were loaded into the cargo hold. However, they were presumed to be scrap metal, therefore non-hazardous, as opposed to coming under IMDG Code Class 4.2. Continue reading »

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