Dec 082014
 

Listen To The Podcast

Seven years ago Bourbon Dolphin capsized during a rig move. It was a tragedy that sent waves thorough the offshore industry but have the lessons been learned?

It is still dark early on the morning of 30th March 2007 in Scalloway, Shetland as Norwegian Captain Oddne Remoy boards the Bourbon Dolphin for the first time. Bourbon Dolphin is less than a year old, painted in the distinctive green and white house colours of Bourbon Offshore Norway. She flies the Norwegian flag.

Remoy is to relieve from the vessel’s existing master, Frank Reiersen, as part of the vessel’s shift – five weeks on and five weeks off and is replacing the ship’s other regular master, Hugo Hansen.  Hansen and Remoy have already discussed Bourbon Dolphin by telephone. Continue reading »

Share
Dec 222007
 

Fears grow for missing tug crew
Metro – London,UK
Ian Plater, sector manager for Clyde Maritime & Coastguard Agency, said: “We commenced our search at first light this morning. Most of the assets and units

‘Series of problems in Dolphin disaster’
The Herald – Glasgow,Scotland,UK
A series of problems and misunderstandings contributed to the Bourbon Dolphin disaster, which claimed eight lives when the oil-rig support tug capsized 75

Cosco Busan Captain’s Lawyer Asks For Hearing On Misconduct Charges
FoxReno.com – Reno,NV,USA
Meadows did object to the board’s accusation of misconduct “on the ground that it is so indefinite and uncertain that (the defendant, Cota) cannot identify 

Fast rescue boats
Amendments to part A of the STCW Code, also enter into force on 1 January 2008, add additional training requirements for the launching and recovery of fast rescue boats.
The amendments were adopted in response to reports of injuries to seafarers in numerous incidents involving the launching and recovery of fast rescue boats in adverse weather conditions.

SKorea to tighten rules against spill-prone oil tankers
AFP –
“Following the accident, we plan to advance the timetable to phase out singled-hulled vessels,” Lee Ki-Sang, deputy director of the Ministry of Maritime 

Share
Oct 022007
 

This, from the ATSB’s report on the grounding of the offshore tug Massive Tide on 29 August 2006 doesn’t need much comment:

“The radar mounted next to the chart table was not working on 29 August or over the preceding days. Consequently, the forward bridge console mounted Koden MD-3840 radar was in use on the morning of the grounding. The second mate set the radar in the north up mode and on the 12 mile range scale. He was accustomed to using more modern radars and electronic charting systems; consequently, he was only using the radar for collision avoidance. During the voyage, the second mate had found the echoes of some targets were hard to read so he increased the radar’s clutter and gain controls. There was some ‘clutter’ showing on the screen but as he was not using the radar for navigation it did not seem important to him. When the master arrived on the bridge after the grounding, he reduced the radar range scale and adjusted the clutter and gain controls. What had appeared to the second mate to be ‘clutter’ was, in fact, Rosemary Island.”

Massive Tide
massivetidecrunch.jpg
Top (Black) line, where the Massive Tide was supposed to go,
Bottom (Red) where she actually went.

Okay, I will make a comment, the second mate had already seen the lights on Rosemary Island and the lights of nearby ships and noticed that they didn’t seem to be in the right place. Says the ATSB report “Despite detecting these critical cues, the second mate either did not understand their significance or was averse to the mental effort involved in concluding that the ship was not in the correct position.”

Share