Is Your Capstan Full Strength?

 Accident, anchor, Offshore, safety alert, Safety Alerts, safety flash  Comments Off on Is Your Capstan Full Strength?
Mar 172015
 

Ensure that the safe working load, SWL, of a capstan is greater than the rated pull of the capstan, says a safety alert from the International Marine Contractors Association, IMCA, following an incident aboard one of its members’ vessels. If the capstan does not stall before the wire fails the resulting parting of the wires can cause horrifying injuries.

Due to the company’s clear deck policy nobody was at risk but similar policies may not be in force, or practical, under other circumstances.

Says the IMCA:

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This Week’s Podcast: The Case of the Errant Hookers

 Accident Investigation, anchor, anchoring., bulk carrier, podcast, Podcasts, weather  Comments Off on This Week’s Podcast: The Case of the Errant Hookers
Jan 192015
 

She’s powerful, unpredictable and pushy. If you don’t keep a firm hold it could mean a rocky relationship gets very deadly.

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Master

The Master

Let’s talk about Chandra. That’s not his real name but he was a real master, 44 years old with 27 years seafaring experience and seven years as a master.

The Ship

Coop Venture The Coop Venture His vessel was the Coop Venture, a Panamanian registered Panamax bulk carrier of 36,080 gross tones witha crew of four Indians and 15 Filipinos. She carried a cargo of

40,280 metric tones of corn from New Orleans, United States, to Shibushi Bay in Kagoshima prefecture, Japan.

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This Week’s Podcast Replay: Part 2 – The Case of the Toppling Tug

 Accident, Accident Investigation, Accident report, AHTS, anchor, capsize, tug  Comments Off on This Week’s Podcast Replay: Part 2 – The Case of the Toppling Tug
Dec 152014
 

When it comes to safety, unless everybody’s on the same page
avoidable tragedies will happen.

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When the anchor-handling tug supply vessel Bourbon Dolphin capsized it came at enormous cost. Not just the loss of an almost new and expensive vessel, and a fine of more than $700,000 against Bourbon Offshore Norway, but, most importantly the loss of eight lives including that of a 14 year old schoolboy whose own life had yet to begin. It was a wake up call to the offshore industry that resonates even today.

It happened not because one man made an error but because an entire system failed to protect those onboard, because policies, procedures and practices that should have created a virtual safety net proved wanting, because not everybody was singing from the same songsheet. Continue reading »

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Losing Anchors – Don’t Be Tempted To Wait

 Accident, anchor, anchoring.  Comments Off on Losing Anchors – Don’t Be Tempted To Wait
Nov 122010
 

Take a bad storm,  officers who perhaps are not as familiar with anchor characteristics affecting their vessel as they should be, a dash of commercial pressure, a master who’s wants to ‘wait and see’, anchors and cables that may be below spec and you have a recipe for losing an anchor.

P&I club Gard Norway says that it has seen an increasing number of lost anchor cases and that according to class societies class societies many as one anchor is lost every year for every 100 ships is lost annually.

Recovering anchors can be costly. Anchors and cables lost around moorings can be a hazard to other vessels

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Safety Alert – Exploding Windlass – Your Experiences?

 anchor, anchoring., ATSB, Australia, Bermuda, Safety Alerts  Comments Off on Safety Alert – Exploding Windlass – Your Experiences?
Aug 182009
 
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Results of a high pressure that couldn't take it

Britain’s Maritime Accident Investigation Branch has appealed to the industry for information on the catastrophic failure of high pressure hydraulic anchor windlasses in its latest Safety Bulletin following several incidents since 2007, some of which have caused serious injury.

Says MAIB: : “Since 2007, the MAIB has been made aware of the catastrophic failure of a number of high pressure hydraulic anchor windlasses. Of those that have occurred, the following are particularly noteworthy:

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Accident Report – Where the Buoys Are

 Accident, Accident report, anchor, MAIB, navigation, tanker  Comments Off on Accident Report – Where the Buoys Are
Aug 172009
 

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The UK’s Maritime Accident Investigation Branch has released its preliminary investigation into the snagging of a buoy anchor cable by the Marshall Islands-registered tanker King Everest:

King Everest was proceeding from anchorage ‘C’ towards the inbound entrance to the New Sand Hole traffic separation scheme (TSS). The tidal stream was setting south-south-east. On approaching the North New Sand buoy on the vessel’s port side, the master reduced speed and ordered hard-a-port. As the vessel was swinging to port, he reduced the helm order and then conversed with an outbound vessel on VHF radio to arrange a passing manoeuvre. On completing the call, the master realised that he had overshot his intended turn. He attempted to recover the situation using helm and engine movements; however, the strong tidal stream set the vessel down onto the North New Sand buoy, snagging the buoy’s anchor cable on her rudder horn.

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May 232008
 

The ATSB has found that the grounding of Pasha Bulker on Nobbys Beach on 8 June 2007 occurred despite a gale warning that should have prompted the master to ballast the ship for heavy weather and take it to sea. A number of other ships also failed to take to sea.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation found that Pasha Bulker‘s master had an inadequate understanding of heavy weather ballast, anchor holding power and the limitations of Newcastle’s weather exposed anchorage.

The safety management system on board Pasha Bulker did not provide the master with specific guidance about safely putting to sea in adverse weather. Neither the masters standing orders nor the passage plan form prescribed in the safety management system contained any guidance with regard to bridge resource or team management or encouraged its use.

The investigation also found that a number of other ships attempted to ride out the gale at anchor and the majority dragged their anchors. A number of masters did not appropriately ballast their ships and many did not understand Newcastle Vessel Traffic Information Centre’s purely advisory role, expecting that it would instruct or inform them to put to sea at an appropriate time. It was also found that the substantial ship queue increased the risks in the anchorage and resulted in another near grounding, a near collision and a number of close-quarters situations at the time.

Newcastle Vessel Traffic Information Centres advisory role “was not properly understood by the masters of a number of the ships in the Newcastle anchorage on 7 June 2007” says the ATSB.

On 23 May, the Panamanian registered bulk carrier Pasha Bulker anchored about two miles off the coast near Newcastle and joined the queue of 57 ships to wait its turn for loading coal. The ship was ballasted for the good weather conditions. Newcastle anchorage is suitable only in good weather and nautical publications contain warnings about the local weather conditions and recommend that masters put to sea before conditions become severe.

On the morning of 7 June, the Bureau of Meteorology issued a gale warning for the area. Winds were expected to increase to 45 knots, with gusts up to 63 knots, after 0400 on 8 June with high seas and a heavy swell. At midday, Pasha Bulker‘s master deployed additional anchor cable and decided to monitor the weather and the ship’s anchor position.

By midnight, the southeast wind was gusting to 30 knots and ships began dragging their anchors. Newcastle Vessel Traffic Information Centre advised those ships that were dragging their anchors. Only seven ships had put to sea in the deteriorating weather while another had weighed anchor to berth in the port.

Newcastle Vessel Traffic Information Centre did not cancel the scheduled berthing of any ship even after weather conditions had become severe. This may have compounded the confusion of some masters about the appropriate time to leave the anchorage. Advice was limited to the masters of only those ships that were dragging their anchors. Some masters assumed, incorrectly, that the appropriate time to weigh anchor was when the centre informed them that their anchor was dragging and may have waited for this guidance to leave the anchorage.

The masters of four ships were rerquested to leave the anchorage at a very late stage, when the weather conditions were extreme and just before Pasha Bulker grounded. The masters of several ships, including Pasha Bulker, had expected the centre to provide them with similar guidance earlier, when weather conditions warranted, enabling them to safely clear the coast.

On 8 June , one ship fouled its anchor on a discarded anchor cable which delayed it from safely putting to sea. At least 40 discarded anchors and cables lie on the seabed in the Newcastle anchorage but most are not charted. The position of some of these hazards and the approximate location of others is known to Newcastle Port Corporation. Such information could be used by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, New South Wales Maritime and the Australian Hydrographic Service to take the necessary action to enhance maritime safety.

By 0600 , the wind was gusting to nearly 50 knots and Pasha Bulker was amongst 27 ships still at anchor. At 0637, when the master was certain that the anchor was dragging, he decided to weigh anchor. At 0748, the ship got underway and for more than an hour, moved in a northeast direction parallel to the coast about one mile away with the wind on its starboard bow.

Newcastle Vessel Traffic Information Centre asked the masters of three ships, including Pasha Bulker, to leave the restricted area off the ports entrance. Given that all three ships were struggling to clear the coast and that there was no need to keep the area clear because there was no traffic into or out of the port, these communications were of no benefit and unnecessary, and may also have adversely influenced the decisions of masters, including Pasha Bulker‘s.

At 0906, the master decided to alter course to put the wind on the ship’s port bow and clear the coast in a southerly direction. The course change in the extreme weather was poorly controlled and Pasha Bulker‘s heading became south-westerly instead of south-southeast as intended. The ship then rapidly approached Nobbys Beach and the master’s desperate attempt to turn the ship to starboard to clear the coast inevitably led to its grounding at 0951 with both anchors in their hawse pipes.

The ATSB says that safety actions have already been taken following the incident but has issued a number of other recommendations and safety advisory notices with the aim of preventing similar incidents in the future.

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Sep 252007
 

MSF, Marine Safety Forum, has set up a work programme in response to the Bourbon Dolphin tragedy in April, 2007, to respond to industry concerns and actions raisedf by the Norwegian Maritime Directorate. A full enquiry is current underway by the NMD.

The Bourbon Dolphin, an Ulstein A102 Anchor Handling Tug Supply vessel capsized and sank during anchor-handling operations for the semi-submersible drilling platform Transocean Rather. According to report on the Marine Link websiteWhen the Bourbon Dolphin attempted to release the inner pin of the anchor, the chain ran free and caught the outer tow pin, which caused the boat to capsize. The emergency release was triggered, but did not perform as designed. Fifteen crew members were onboard, seven survived, three bodies were found, and five are still missing, thought to be trapped in the vessel.”

Only one member of the bridge team survived.

Pending release of a full report the NMD has released a series of measures for Norwegian-registered vessels intended to avoid similar incidents. Copies are available here.

Bourbon itself has established a fund of the families of those lost in the incident .

MSF will hold a workgroup review meeting in Aberdeen on 28 November 2007, preparatory to the MSF all members meeting on the 29th.

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