Marine Safety Forum has issued a brief report on an incident in which an offshore supply vessel lost power due to an incorrectly set quick-closing valve which led to contact with and offshore installation. The report does not name the vessel or installation but it is believed to be the Grampian Defender Collision with the Magnus Platform reported in the Aberdeen-based newspaper Evening Express.
The MSF alerts says: “A Platform Supply Vessel was working weather-side to an installation carrying out deck cargo operations.
The vessel suffered a black-out and subsequently made contact with the Platform. The cause of the
blackout was discovered to be the accidental closure of the quick-closing fuel valve of the single line main engine fuel supply system.
The vessel made contact with the Platform’s legs then drifted underneath the walking bridge linked to an adjacent platform resulting in damages to the mast, firefighting monitor and funnel.
After tank inspection it was discovered that the vessel had also suffered hull damage.
1. The vessel has been designed with a single line fuel system. In case of a shutdown in this system both engines will shut down.
2. The quick-closing valve tripped due to incorrect resetting of the valve.
Procedural and / or Organizational Findings
1. There was no weather side working risk assessment made prior to commencing the operation.
(The NWEA guidelines state that the vessel has to make a risk assessment if working on weather side of the platform).
2. There is no procedure or guidance in place for the correct handling during testing of quick-
closing valves or a general procedure for testing of equipment.
3. When the critical alarms were activated, the Chief Engineer did not inform the bridge.
4. No evidence was found of the level of competence of the Chief Engineer.
Human Factor Findings
1. The reason of the shutdown of the quick-closing valve was that this valve was not correctly reset after the last test.
Mast, radio equipment and other damages will be repaired.
1. All vessels to be informed about this accident and instructed how to solve problems with the quick-closing valves if occurring. Weather side working must be carried out according to the NWEA guidelines.
2. Guidance to be drawn up for general testing of equipment including the quick-closing valves.
3. Close-standby situations are prohibited; this must be implemented in the Shipboard Management System.
4. Guidance to be drawn up for alerting the bridge and to abort operations in the 500 meter zone when there are critical alarms. Critical alarms to be identified as per risk assessment.
5. A crew evaluation to be carried out when new crew start for the company. Crewing department are responsible for building up a personal dossier.
1. The separation of vessels fuel systems to increase the level of redundancy.
2. Modification of the fuel system on the sister vessels and vessels with similar arrangements.
3. Risk Assessments should be made for critical equipment and systems to prevent incorrect designs which could result in accidents.